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I. INTRODUCTION
The legitimacy of the drug-detecting canine (canine) was universally
established by the Supreme Court in United States v. Place.1 Although
the decision in Place was reached on a different issue, the court approved
law enforcement's use of the canine sniff.2 The court reasoned that the
sniffing of luggage by a canine did not constitute a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.3 Place, however, did not discuss the
training of the canines or the mechanics of the canine's behavior which
led the trainer to determine that contraband had been detected.
Since Place, the Supreme Court has not revisited the subject, leaving
the lower courts to establish guidelines concerning the training and relia-
bility of canines. Since then, a fair amount of case law has developed.
Today, the drug-detecting canine is the government's most powerful
weapon in the escalating war against drugs along the Texas-Mexico bor-
der region (border region). No number of agents can equal a properly
trained dog's effectiveness at detecting hidden contraband.4 This effec-
tiveness is probably why the courts along the border region, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, have lagged behind
other courts in establishing guidelines that ensure both the adequate
training and reliability of canines. It is important to note that while a dog
alert may constitute, along with other observations and other evidence,
one of perhaps several factors that are considered when establishing the
justification of a search, the searches discussed in this article are sup-
ported only by a canine alert, as occurs in the border region in the over-
whelming majority of cases.
The following is a brief overview of the origins of trained-canine law
and its evolution into what is considered the majority training and relia-
bility view. This view will be compared to current Fifth Circuit precedent,
which the author considers deficient and in need of change. The author
will then discuss the recently unearthed Horton v. Goose Creek Indepen-
1. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
2. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 698 (1983).
3. Id. at 707.
4. See Sandra Guerra, Criminal Law: Domestic Drug Interdiction Operations: Find-
ing the Balance, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1151-55 (1992).
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dent School District5 and its importance in eliminating the practice of us-
ing canines to perform the suspicionless, up-close sniffing of people at the
border.
II. BASIC CONCEPTS
A. The Alert
An "alert" is a dog's "defined final response" to a given scent.6 Nor-
mally, canines are either categorized as passive-alerters, noted by their
sitting or laying down at the moment of detection, or as aggressive-
alerters, marked by their scratching or biting at the source emitting the
odor.' The mechanics of an alert was the controlling issue in United
States v. Rivas.8 After crossing into the United States from Mexico, a dog
was used to detect the presence of contraband in a tractor-trailer at an
international bridge.9 At a suppression hearing, the government's evi-
dence showed that the dog did not exhibit a strong, aggressive alert.1°
Rather, the evidence showed the dog temporarily stopped at the alleged
moment of detection before continuing with his examination."l The bor-
5. 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982).
6. See Interview with Dan Craig, Doctor of Veterinary Medicine, in Laredo, Tex.
(2001) [hereinafter Interview]. This definition is taken from that used by Dan Craig, Doc-
tor of Veterinary Medicine. See id. Dr. Craig has testified numerous times as an expert on
the training and reliability of canines. See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739 (1st
Cir. 1999); United States v. Outlaw, 134 F. Supp. 2d 807 (W.D. Tex. 2001); United States v.
Kennedy, 955 F. Supp. 1331 (D.N.M. 1996), rev'd, 131 F.3d 1371 (10th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Richard De Berry Miller, L-99-1004 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2000) (Motion to Suppress
before Chief Judge George P. Kazen). A drug-sniffing canine can be trained to bark, paw,
or sit upon detection of narcotics. See Andy G. Rickman, Currency Contamination and
Drug-Sniffing Canines: Should Any Evidentiary Value Be Attached to a Dog's Alert on
Cash?, 85 Ky. L.J. 199, 209 (1997). Such behavior constitutes an "alert" used to support a
claim of reasonable suspicion or evidentiary factor to validate searches. Id. at 209-10.
Learning how his dog responds upon detection of narcotics, the handler requires longer
and more extensive training in comparison to the dog. See Robert C. Bird, An Examina-
tion of the Training and Reliability of the Narcotics Detection Dog, 85 Ky. L.J. 405, 413
(1996-97). Both the dog and its handler must pass periodic recertification exercises upon
completion of their training. Id. The training of a narcotic dog directly impacts the relia-
bility of the canine sniff. Id. at 421. Reliability is most commonly indicated by a dog's
accuracy rate in detecting narcotics, which is usually recorded by the handlers and thus
presentable in court. Id. at 425.
7. See Kenneth L. Pollack, Stretching the Terry Doctrine to the Search for Evidence of
Crime: Canine Sniffs, State Constitutions, and the Reasonable Suspicion Standard, 47
VAND. L. REV. 803, 805 n.l (1994); Rickman, supra note 6, at 209-10.
8. 157 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 1998).
9. See United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 1998).
10. See id. at 368.
11. See id.
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der search doctrine12 enables government agents to perform routine
searches-those searches "that do not 'seriously invade a traveler's pri-
vacy'" 13-at international borders or their functional equivalent without
a warrant, probable cause, or any other justification for the search.14
Thus, in order to pass constitutional muster, a non-routine stop and
search like in Rivas, requires reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.15 In
Rivas, the Fifth Circuit determined that drilling into a conveyance, in this
case the trailer wall, amounted to a non-routine search, necessitating a
predicate finding of reasonable suspicion.16 The court held that the dog's
alert lacked the defined response characteristics of an acceptable alert
and thus did not support probable cause.17 Further, the court held that
the alert could not even support a finding of reasonable suspicion,
thereby invalidating the search.18
Whether a canine has alerted at all is itself a question that has re-
mained largely unexamined by our jurisprudence; other than Rivas, no
other Fifth Circuit opinion has addressed the subject. What is clear is that
at least as it concerns the border region, a canine handler's representa-
tions about how a canine alerts are as varied as the number of canines
themselves. Consequently because virtually all handlers will represent
that their canine alerted in connection with a contraband find, their con-
clusions continue to enjoy total deference by trial courts. Dr. Dan J.
Craig, a noted expert in the field of canine instruction and performance
shares the following:
Detector dog handlers have been known to say things like 'I can read
my dog,' 'My dog knows its there,' 'My dog's behavior tells me its in
there: [sic]', 'I can read my dog's behavioral change and I know the
odor is there,' 'I am the only one who can read my dog,' 'I know
what my dog is thinking,' 'I know when he is in the scent cone [sic],'
et cetera. Are they just repeating what they were taught? If not,
where do they get this notion? In initial training and subsequent
training the only time they reward (reinforce) their dog is when the
dog makes the definitive defined final response. Then and only then
12. See generally Gregory T. Arnold, Issues in the Third Circuit: Criminal Law - Bor-
dering on Unreasonablesness?: The Third Circuit Again Expands the Border Search Excep-
tion in United States v. Hyde, 40 VILL. L. REV. 835, 842-52 (1995) (discussing the history of
the border search exception).
13. Rivas, 156 F.3d 364.
14. See id. at 367 (citing United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1147-48 (5th Cir.
1993)).
15. See id.
16. See United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir. 1998).
17. See id. at 368.
18. See id.
[Vol. 5:227
CANINES AT THE U.S-MEXICO BORDER
can the trainer verify that the dog has detected and responded to a
specific target odor. The dog is rewarded for that response and no
other.
The first thing one must do ... is to decide what specifc response
the dog must make in order to determine if it is responding correctly
to a selected target odor ... . The handler or trainer must be able to
articulate that specific response to anyone not in the dog training
profession. That specific response is the only response you reward
with the selected primary reinforcement....
If the dog does not make the defined final response sometime dur-
ing a search, the target odor is either not present or the dog or han-
dler made an error. Dogs do respond when no target odor is present.
They also fail to respond when a target odor is present. The handler
may assume any response other than the defined final response veri-
fies the presence of a target odor. A [sic] this point the handler is
guilty of interpretation, supposition, or speculation. The dog has the
olfactory sensing system (nose) and the final decision as to the pres-
ence or absence of a target odor is up to the dog and not the handler.
A well- trained detector dog will only respond only to the target
odor(s) it has been properly trained to detect. That dog will emit the
defined final response it was trained to make to a target odor at a
predetermined rate of accuracy.
Educated guesses based upon the handler's knowledge of their
dog's training and past performance are nothing more than educated
guesses when their dog fails to make the defined final response dur-
ing a specific search .... When a dog makes the defined final re-
sponse and no target odors are found on physical search one must
rely on forensic chemical analysis to justify the accuracy of the dog.19
In light of the holding in Rivas, Dr. Craig's commentary underscores
the need to cross-examine a handler regarding the specific manner in
which the canine is trained to alert. Because the existence of an alert is
an essential issue in a suppression hearing, a lawyer should never stipu-
late that a canine has alerted.
B. Location
In United States v. Seals,"° the Fifth Circuit adopted the principle that a
search cannot extend beyond the area to which the canine specifically
19. Memorandum from Dr. Dan J. Craig, BS, DVM, MS, to Jorge G. Aristotelidis
(Mar. 3, 2002) (on file with author).
20. 987 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1993).
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alerted.2' In Seals, a canine alerted to an area between the front seats of
a car, which resulted in the discovery of a glass pipe with cocaine resi-
due.22 The officer conducting the search then noticed that the rear seat
area had been modified to allow access to the trunk.23 The court rea-
soned that the discovery of the pipe, combined with the defendant's ner-
vousness, his false answers, and the modification of the rear seat provided
the officers with probable cause to believe that additional drugs were
contained within the vehicle.24 Since the officers did not know exactly
where in the car the drugs were located, the court found that the officers
had probable cause to search the entire vehicle.25
In reaching its decision in Seals, the Fifth Circuit relied on United States
v. Ross,26 a Supreme Court case distinguishing between probable cause to
believe that drugs are in a particular section of the car and probable cause
to believe that drugs are generally within the car.27 The Court in Ross
explained that having probable cause to believe that a container placed
inside a taxi's trunk contained some evidence or contraband, does not
justify searching the entire car.21 The Supreme Court concluded that of-
ficers are limited to searching the area of a car in which they have proba-
ble cause to believe contraband is present.29 Yet, the Court stated that
when probable cause to search a vehicle exists, such probable cause can
also justify searching all of the parts and contents in which the object of
the search may be hidden.3" Thus, the Seals court held that when officers
have probable cause to believe contraband is located generally in a car,
but are not sure of its particular location within the car, they may search
the entire vehicle.31 The Seals court noted that, upon its review of the
record, it found no explanation with regard to whether the dog alerted to
a particular section or the entire area of the car;3 2 therefore, the court
determined that the dog alerted only to the passenger compartment.33
The court concluded, however, that once the officer discovered the glass
21. See United States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1107 n.8 (5th Cir. 1993).
22. See id. at 1107.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
27. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
28. See id. at 824.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 825.
31. See United States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1107 (5th Cir. 1993).
32. See id.
33. See id.
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pipe containing cocaine residue, the officer had probable cause to search
the entire car.34
Seals appears to be firm authority for challenging the discovery of con-
traband in a part of a vehicle separate from the area to which the dog
specifically alerts. As in Rivas, the holding in Seals emphasizes the need
to examine the specific conduct of a canine during an evidentiary hearing.
III. CANINE LAW
A. The Majority View
In United States v. Diaz,35 the Sixth Circuit required an analysis of a
dog's training and reliability before allowing a positive reaction by the
dog to be an indication of probable cause.36 While not among the first
opinions to espouse the concept that a canine must be both trained and
proven to be reliable, Diaz represents the most thorough analysis of what
constitutes a dog's reliability, and therefore merits an in-depth discussion.
Diaz sought to suppress marijuana found in his car pursuant to an alert
by "Dingo," a dog trained to detect contraband, contending that the dog's
training and reliability had not been established.37 The court recognized
that other jurisdictions have yet to conclusively address the criteria, such
as quantity or quality of evidence needed, for establishing a drug detec-
tion dog's training and reliability.3 8 It added that, evidence presented to
establish that a dog is certified to detect drugs generally opens the door to
the introduction of evidence that may detract from the dog's reliability
but may go to the dog's credibility. For example, testimony by the dog's
trainer and records of the dog's training can establish that the dog is certi-
fied to detect contraband;39 however, lack of such evidence, such as docu-
mentation of the exact course of training, may negatively affect the dog's
reliability. 4° Expert testimony attacking the reliability of the dog's per-
formance or the lack of additional evidence to support the dog's credibil-
ity and reliability may also negatively affect a dog's credibility and
reliability.4"
34. See id. Probable cause was also based on the defendant's nervousness, false an-
swers, and a modified rear seat. See id.
35. 25 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 1994).
36. See United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 394 (6th Cir. 1994).
37. See id. at 393.
38. See id. at 394.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
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At the evidentiary hearing on Diaz's motion to suppress, evidence es-
tablishing Dingo's training and reliability was introduced.42 Through an
expert witness, Diaz attempted to discredit the reliability of the dog by
highlighting the fact, conceded by the dog handler, that the dog had on
several occasions failed to alert to the presence of drugs, which is known
as a false positive alert.43 The dog's handler described one such instance
at an airport search. Dennard explained that although drugs were not
present, the owner of the suitcase Dingo identified, admitted to smoking
marijuana the whole weekend and that the scent could have still been on
her clothing in the suitcase. 4 The appellate court, finding that the single
incident of a false positive alert was not so significant that it should de-
tract from Dingo's reliability, upheld the district court's determination
that Dingo was sufficiently reliable.45 It further concluded that a very
small percentage of error or false positives does not necessarily prove
that a drug detecting canine is unreliable or diminishes the fact that the
dog is properly trained and certified.46
In reaching its conclusion, the Diaz court referred to United States v.
Alvarado47 and United States v. Spetz.48 These cases serve as empirical
examples of what percentages are acceptable in looking at whether a drug
detection dog is properly trained and certified.49 With regard to the ab-
42. Deputy Sheriff Kris Dennard, Dingo's trainer and handler, testified during the
evidentiary hearing on Diaz's motion to suppress. She testified that both she and the dog
had completed an eight-week training course. Id. at 394. Dingo underwent "live" search
tests in which drugs were present and "dead" search tests in which drugs were not present.
Id. In order to become certified, Dingo had to successfully indicate fourteen live targets,
which he did. Id. Indications were noted by barking, biting, scratching, and at times by
coming to a standstill in the presence of an intense scent. Id. at 394-95. Dennard testified
that since their initial certification, she and Dingo had passed recertification tests every
year. Id. By Diaz's evidentiary hearing, the team had searched for the presence of contra-
band approximately 1500 times. Id. Only once had Dingo indicated that illegal substances
were present, and none were found although evidence of the presence of drugs existed. Id.
Regarding Mr. Diaz, Dennard testified that she led Dingo around a test car before scenting
Diaz's vehicle so there would not be any inappropriate suggestions. Id. Dingo went on to
alert to Diaz's vehicle after not having alerted to the test car. Dennard's testimony was
found to be credible by the district court. Id.
43. See id. at 395.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 395-96.
46. See id. at 396.
47. No. 90-6058, 1991 WL 119265 (6th Cir. July 1, 1991) (not designated for
publication).
48. 721 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1983).
49. See United States v. Alvarado, No. 90-6058, 1991 WL 119265, at *2 (6th Cir. July
1, 1991) (noting a 95% accuracy in detecting narcotics); United States v. Spetz, 721 F.2d
1457, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983) (identifying accuracy rates of fifty-six out of sixty-one and two
out of six acceptable).
[Vol. 5:227
CANINES AT THE U.S-MEXICO BORDER
sence of training and performance records, the court found that testi-
mony could more than adequately establish a dog's reliability concerning
a valid dog sniff.50 It added that training and performance documenta-
tion coupled with testimony of his trainer could adequately establish the
dog's reliability."1 The court recognized that the reliability of canine
sniffs should be established by neutral criteria, rather than random, non-
standardized procedures that invite unconscious cuing and undercut the
reliability of the sniff.52 The fact that Dennard was familiar with the sus-
pected vehicle created the possibility for unconscious cuing; however, the
Diaz court agreed that the possibility was reduced by the use of identical
procedures on the test vehicle and Diaz's vehicle. 3
Like Diaz, most of the other circuits have through their own formula-
tions, embraced the concept that in addition to training, a satisfactory
showing of reliability is necessary to uphold a search based on a canine
alert.5 4 The D.C. Circuit is one of the few circuits that has not explicitly
stated a requirement that a canine be reliable.55
50. See United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 396.
51. See id.
52. See id. (citing United States v. Trayer, 898 F.2d 805, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
53. See id.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Limares, 269 F.3d 794 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding affidavits
to be sufficient support for a dog's reliability); United States v. Stanley, No. 00-4289, 2001
WL 98368 (4th Cir. 2001) (unpublished table decision) (determining that expert testimony
regarding the dog and its training is sufficient to establish the dog's reliability); United
States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739 (1st Cir. 1999) (determining that the existence of probable
cause based on an alert by a drug dog depends upon the dog's reliability); United States v.
Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that sniff alone can supply probable
cause for issuing a warrant when evidence of reliability is presented); United States v.
Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523 (10th Cir. 1993) (determining a dog alert might not establish proba-
ble cause if the particular dog had a poor accuracy record); United States v. Massac, 867
F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding an alert given by a dog trained to detect contraband is
sufficient to establish probable cause); United States v. Waltzer, 682 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1982)
(holding that a designation by a dog with a record of accuracy establishes probable cause);
United States v. Klein, 626 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding an affiant's representation to
the magistrate that a dog graduated from training sufficient).
55. For example, in United States v. Watson, while discussing the qualifications of Max
25, a 1982 graduate of the Maryland Police Department's canine narcotics detection school,
a district court wrote that although the judicial system had in the past been skeptical of
canine narcotics detection, the technique is now common such that a formal recitation of
the dog's training is unnecessary when applying for a warrant. See United States v. Wat-
son, 551 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (D.D.C. 1982). However, subsequent opinions have made it a
point to note Max 25's success rate, which has earned him a celebrated reputation. See,
e.g., United States v. Trayer, 898 F.2d 805, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting Max properly
alerted finding drugs in fifty-eight out of sixty searches); United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d
469, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (describing Max 25 as "first in his class"); United States v. Rush,
673 F. Supp. 1097, 1099 (D.D.C. 1987) (citing Max 25 had found narcotics fifty-three times,
and he has been correct better than ninety-six percent of the time); United States v.
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An examination of holdings by each of the courts espousing the major-
ity view reveals that in determining reliability, most federal circuit courts
have accepted some margin of error in the dog's performance history
when upholding a search.5 6 It is necessary that certain standards be im-
plemented prior to issuing a warrant based partly on a canine's positive
alert. The magistrate should be advised of the exact training the detector
dog has received, the criteria used in selecting dogs for drug detection
training, the standards the dog was required to meet to successfully com-
plete his training program, and the dog's "track record" prior to the
search with the emphasis on the amount of false negatives or mistakes the
dog has made. Only after this information has been furnished is a magis-
trate justified in issuing a warrant.57 In order to establish this standard
however, it is necessary to keep an accurate record of the dog's success
and failure rate. Unfortunately, this practice is not required by the Fifth
Circuit; consequently, it is not followed by the law enforcement agencies
that fall under its jurisdiction.
B. The Fifth Circuit
In United States v. Williams,58 the defendant's car was searched after a
trained canine alerted to it. 9 Williams challenged the warrantless search
by alleging that the sniff test by the dog could not be relied upon until the
canine's training and reliability were first proven.6 ° In its discussion, the
Liberto, 660 F. Supp. 889, 890 (D.D.C.1987) (explaining that Max 25 had correctly identi-
fied narcotics ninety-five percent of the times he had had an opportunity to do so); see also
1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 2.2(f), at 366 (3d ed. 1997). LaFave states:
[i]n light of the careful training which [narcotic] dogs receive, an alert by a dog is
deemed to constitute probable cause for an arrest or search if sufficient showing is
made as to the reliability of the particular dog used in detecting the presence of a
particular type of contraband.
Id.
56. LAFAVE, supra note 55, at 367 n.240. LaFave adds:
Various methods of providing an index of the dog's reliability and credibility narrow
down to some basic elements. The magistrate should be advised of the following: the
exact training the detector dog has received, the standards or criteria employed in
selecting dogs for [drug] detection training, the standards the dog was required to
meet to successfully complete his training program, the 'track record' of the dog up
until the search (emphasis must be placed on the amount of false negatives or mis-
takes the dog has furnished). Only after this information has been furnished is a mag-
istrate justified in issuing a warrant.
Id. at 367 n.240.
57. Id.
58. 69 F.3d 27 (5th Cir. 1995).
59. See United States v. Williams, 69 F.3d 27 (5th Cir. 1995).
60. See id. at 28.
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Fifth Circuit drew from United States v. Daniel,6 which held that demon-
strating a drug dog's reliability was not necessary to obtain a search war-
rant,62 adding the theory that an affidavit that discussing a dog's history
of reliability was without jurisprudential support in the circuit.63 Williams
invited the court to follow the training-and-reliability standard set out in
Diaz, but the request was expressly rejected.64 The Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that since it is not necessary to prove a dog's reliability when ob-
taining a search warrant, a fortiori, proving the dog's reliability is not
required if probable cause is developed as a result of a dog's alert on a
vehicle.65 Williams continues to represent the Fifth Circuit's flagship
opinion on canines.66
1. Williams and Discovery
The first Fifth Circuit opinion to expose the limitations in Williams was
United States v. Hare.67 In Hare, a canine alert provided a deputy with
probable cause to open Hare's trunk.68 The Hare court took note of the
fact that the Williams holding was silent regarding the discovery of a
dog's training or certification. 69  The court recognized the Williams
court's refusal to adopt the requirement for both training and reliability
as set forth in Diaz,70 and the court noted Williams did not help resolve
whether a dog's training must be proven.71 The Hare court, however,
determined that case law favoring drug alert dogs consistently refers to
"trained" dogs, and therefore, the court concluded, proof of a dog's train-
ing is required. 72 Thus, with regards to the request for discovery, the
court found that although probable cause existed on the informant's in-
formation alone, the dog's alert merely served to corroborate the inform-
61. 982 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1993).
62. See United States v. Daniel, 982 F.2d 146, 151 n.7 (5th Cir. 1993).
63. See Williams, 69 F.3d at 28.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See Williams, 69 F.3d 27. Joining the Fifth Circuit, the Eighth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits support a finding of probable cause based on a dog alert simply by demonstrating the
canine is trained, without any need to establish its reliability. See United States v. Sundby,
186 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 1999) (determining that a dog's positive indication alone is
enough to establish probable cause for the presence of a controlled substance); United
States v. Sentovich, 677 F.2d 834, 838 n.8 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that proof of the relia-
bility of the dog is not essential once there is a positive alert).
67. 932 F. Supp 852 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
68. See United States v. Hare, 932 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
69. See id. at 853.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
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ant's story.73 The court suggested that where a dog sniff is the only
method used to obtain probable cause, then a court might require a
higher standard of proving the dog's training.74 Following Hare, when a
canine alert is the sole source for probable cause, the defendant should
make a discovery request for all evidence of the dog's training.
2. United States v. Outlaw: A Study of Williams
a. The Need for a Training and Reliability Standard
United States v. Outlaw75 represents the first opinion from a court
within the Fifth Circuit to squarely address Williams' refusal to require a
showing of a canine's reliability. Outlaw raised several grounds in a mo-
tion to suppress, including an attack on the training and reliability of a
canine whose alert resulted in the discovery of PCP in the defendant's
suitcase.76 With regard to the canine's training, its handler acknowledged
that the dog, Gerri, was not certified to detect the presence of PCP. 77
The defendant argued that even the dog handler lacked training to detect
the quantity of drugs the dog was trained to detect.78 In addition, the dog
handler was not aware of what distraction techniques were used during
certification and training searches. Further, the agent was unaware of
whether controlled negative testing was used to indicate any false posi-
tives Gerri had during training.79
The defendant went on to challenge the reliability of a the canine in-
spection team with expert witness testimony provided by Dr. Dan Craig,
D.V.M. s° A central theme of Dr. Craig's testimony was that only records
demonstrating the canine's training and success and failure rates, includ-
ing false alerts, would serve to establish its reliability.8" Although the
defendant requested such records prior to the evidentiary hearing, the
request was denied.82 At the evidentiary hearing, the dog handler testi-
fied that he did not keep Gerri's field records.8 3 Since no training or field
records existed, Dr. Craig believed that it was not possible to establish
Gerri's reliability as a drug detection dog.84 As a result of this testimony,
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. 134 F. Supp. 2d 807 (W.D. Tex. 2001).
76. See United States v. Outlaw, 134 F. Supp. 2d 807, 810 (W.D. Tex. 2001).
77. See id. at 811.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
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the defendant argued that the government's failure to produce such evi-
dence precluded a determination that the canine's alert was reliable."
Thus, the dog's alert was not enough to establish probable cause to search
the suitcase. 6
The Outlaw court ruled that Williams did not preclude a challenge to a
canine's reliability. Instead, the court concluded that canine alert reliabil-
ity may be challenged in order to establish that agents do not have the
probable cause to conduct a search and seizure.87 Accordingly, the court
declined to apply Williams and Daniel in establishing a per se rule that a
canine alert always establishes probable cause.88 Rather, the court found
that "a canine alert by a properly trained dog is prima facie proof that the
officer had probable cause for a search or seizure. ' 89 The opinion further
elaborates that although a trained and certified canine is all the proof
required to establish the reliability of a canine, the defendant carries the
burden to challenge reliability through a showing that the totality of the
circumstances rebuts the claim.9" In another first for the circuit, Judge
Furgeson then engaged in an examination of the literature and case law
addressing canine alerts.91 Among other observations, he accepted that
even though canine inspections are highly accurate, they are not an infal-
lible means for detecting the presence of contraband.92 Since reliability
depends on the human handler, it is susceptible to error because the sub-
tle signals of the canine must be interpreted.93 In fact, most erroneous
alerts originate from misinterpretation by the handler, rather than the
canine's signals. 4
False alerts can even result from conscious and unconscious signals
from the handler, essentially causing the canine to suspect contraband.95
The D.C. Circuit in United States v. Trayer96 realized this problem and
noted that it was "mindful that less than scrupulously neutral procedures,
which create at least the possibility of unconscious 'cuing,' may well jeop-
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 812.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 813; see also Bird, supra note 6, at 421-31 (noting some of the empirical
evidence showing instances of low accuracy by canine inspections and examining the fac-
tors that cause such errors).
93. See id.
94. See Bird, supra note 6, at 422-23.
95. Id.
96. 898 F.2d 805 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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ardize the reliability of dog sniffs.",9 7 With this background, Judge
Furgeson expressed his reluctance to create a holding that would prohibit
defendants from raising the possibility of such errors or that would create
the potential for a canine alert to be a means for suspicionless and war-
rantless searches and seizures.98
The court then referenced Diaz in examining the Sixth Circuit's re-
quirement that both the training and reliability of the dog be proven. 99
Mindful of Williams' explicit rejection of the standard in Diaz, the Outlaw
court did not interpret Williams to mean that a drug sniffing dog does not
have to be "trained and reliable" in order for a signal to establish proba-
ble cause.' 00 The court explained that the most logical interpretation of
Williams sets forth the idea that the government does not have to be bur-
dened with producing records for a canine's reliability when it has already
proven that the canine inspection team had been trained to find contra-
band.'0 ' However, the defendant may set forth evidence of unreliability
in order to challenge the reliability of the canine inspection team itself.'
The court agreed with the government's position that the canine team
was trained for drug detection and was certified to detect a variety of
drugs.' 0 3 Therefore, the district court concluded that probable cause had
been established due to the training and reliability of Gerri and Agent
Navarro's canine team.'
0 4
Although the opinion in Outlaw is logical and promising, its message is
ultimately cabined by the dictates of Williams. In Diaz, the government
failed to produce documentation supporting the dog's training and relia-
bility; nevertheless, the agent's detailed testimony was deemed sufficient
for this purpose. Though it declares a defendant's right to challenge the
reliability of the canine inspection with evidence of unreliability, the
court in Outlaw ultimately relied only on evidence of training to deter-
mine that the dog was reliable.10 5 Though Judge Furgeson's opinion sug-
gests that he would have allowed access to and examination of this
information by the defendant's expert if the information existed, the
court's finding that the dog was reliable without this information effec-
tively eliminated the possibility that the defense team could ever examine
this evidence. Sadly, this reasoning only reinforces the incentive for law
97. United States v. Trayer, 898 F.2d 805, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
98. See United States v. Outlaw, 134 F. Supp. 2d 807, 814 (W.D. Tex. 2001).
99. See id.
100. See id. (citing United States v. Williams, 69 F.3d 217, 218 (5th Cir. 1995)).
101. See Outlaw, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 814.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See generally United States v. Outlaw, 134 F. Supp. 2d 807 (W.D. Tex. 2001).
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enforcement agencies to continue to fail in maintaining training and relia-
bility records.
In the end, the court's attempt to reconcile Williams with Diaz repre-
sents more of an effort to salvage Williams' credibility as authority, rather
than to devise a workable standard. On the positive side, Outlaw further
exposes the legacy of Williams-the promotion of unaccountability by
our law enforcement agencies at the border, as evidenced by their total
lack of documentation on the canines' performance during training and
on the field.
b. The Problem with False Alerts
The proposition that an alert will produce contraband that a canine is
trained to detect is a straightforward concept. However, what should the
court do when an alert results in the discovery of contraband that the dog
is not trained to detect?
The opinion in Outlaw addressed this issue with very little success. The
court wrote that even through Gerri was not trained to detect PCP, this
by itself did not terminate probable cause.1 °6 The court assumed that the
dog alerted to the scent of a drug that it was trained to detect, but was no
longer present. To buttress this position, the court reasoned that the dogs
are not trained to detect the presence of narcotics but rather their
odor. 10 7 Therefore, an alert does not necessarily signal the essence of
seizable amounts of any narcotic.108 Rather, it could simply indicate a
prior exposure to that narcotic.10 9
This theory, now a popular explanation offered by the government at
suppression hearings, has logical but little empirical support. In fact, as
the defense expert in Outlaw pointed out, the opposite is true. Dr. Craig
observed that, while not trained to detect specific quantities of drugs, the
dogs are only trained to detect and alert to amounts that are physically
detectable.110 He added that canines used by federal law enforcement
106. See id. at 814-15 (writing that a false alert does not by itself undermine probable
cause). For a similar treatment of the same issue, see United States v. Chronister, 1995 WL
547815 (10th Cir.1995) (unpublished table opinion). Outlaw's reference to the Chronister
opinion is of no consequence. Any attempt to formulate a system for grading the reliabil-
ity of the canine with an accepted margin of error would still not be possible given the
government's complete failure to keep such records.
107. See Outlaw, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 814-15; see also United States v. Kennedy, 131
F.3d 1371, 1375 n.6 (10th Cir.1997).
108. See Outlaw, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 814-15; see also Kennedy, 131 F.3d at 1375 n.6.
109. See Outlaw, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 814-15; see also Kennedy, 131 F.3d at 1375 n.6.
110. See Outlaw, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 811; see also Interview, supra note 6 (discussing a
dog's ability to merely detect a certain quantity of contraband).
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authorities are not trained to detect residual odors.'I:I" It is this factor in
Outlaw that highlights the significance of the agent's inability to provide
any information about the minimum quantity of drug the dog is trained to
detect. Without this information, the court must either assume that the
dog really did not alert or that the dog's behavior was the result of han-
dler error. As it turns out, the court did not have to engage in a discus-
sion about the dog's reliability vis-d-vis Williams to reach a proper
resolution. Without evidentiary support of training to detect residual
drug odors, under Williams, the fact that the substance discovered was
not one that the canine was trained to detect required the suppression of
the contraband found.
As further support for upholding the discovery of the PCP, the court
then relied upon the Tenth Circuit's observation that it does not necessa-
rily follow that a false alert indicates that no narcotic odor was de-
tected." 2 Since the residue of narcotics can be detected on items that
have been in contact with drugs," 3 the detection of this residue can occur
without finding a sizable quantity of drugs." 4 By relying on the fact that
trace amounts of drugs may be on virtually every person within the
United States, the court only weakened any effort to establish the relia-
bility of the canine, and ultimately, its decision to uphold the search.' 15
Taken to its logical conclusion, the court's reasoning opens the door to
inconsistent results. For example, a dog alert on a vehicle stopped at a
secondary inspection area can be interpreted to mean that the dog alerted
not only to the drug scent on the currency possessed by its passengers, but
also to the scent remaining at the site of the detection the last time drugs
were found on other vehicles previously searched.
The court in Outlaw then provides support for its position that the dog
has alerted to the scent of a drug that is "no longer there" by adding that
"it is likely, if not highly probable, that a person who smuggles in one
111. See Interview, supra note 6. Residual odor is the odor remaining after a specific
amount of a certain drug has been removed from a specific location. See id.
112. See Outlaw, 134 F. Supp. at 815 (citing Kennedy, 131 F.3d at 1375 n.6).
113. See Outlaw, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 815.
114. See id.
115. See Mark Curriden, Courts Reject Drug-Tainted Evidence: Studies Find Cocaine-
Soiled Cash so Prevalent That Even Janet Reno Had Some, 79 A.B.A. J. 22 (Aug. 1993).
For cases on tainted currency, see United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1214-18 (3d Cir.
1994); United States v. $5,000 in United States Currency, 40 F.3d 847, 849 (6th Cir. 1994);
United States v. $53,082 in United States Currency, 985 F.2d 245, 250 n.5 (6th Cir. 1993);
United States v. $639,588 in United States Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 714 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(referencing expert testimony that 90% of all cash in the United States contains sufficient
quantities of cocaine to alert a trained dog); and United States v. $80,760 in United States
Currency, 781 F. Supp. 462, 475 n.32 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (indicating that residue from narcot-
ics contaminates as much as 96% of the currency currently in circulation).
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type of drug has had contact with other types of drugs so that a trained
dog would detect its odor."' 16 Again, assuming that canines were actu-
ally trained to detect the residual odor of drugs, the theory would have
some support if it could be demonstrated that the vehicle in question was
possessed for such a purpose. This theory crumbles when the vehicle is a
rental, as is frequently the case when drugs are found in vehicles at the
border.
In its final analysis, the court upheld the discovery of contraband based
on its conclusion that the contraband was discovered incident to a valid
alert to other drugs that the canine was trained to detect, but that were no
longer there. 117 Reasoning such as this will continue to surface as long as
trial courts continue to rely on Williams, a decision that promotes a re-
fusal to require specific technical data in the training of canines and in the
measurement of their performance on the field. The opinion in Outlaw
implicitly shows why Williams should be overruled and replaced with the
Diaz standard.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit's anticipated evaluation of Judge
Furgeson's interpretation of Williams was not to be. In one brief sen-
tence, the circuit wholly avoided this discussion, opting to simply affirm
that, on the facts of the case before it, the trial court's conclusion that the
canine employed was trained and reliable, would remain undisturbed." 8
It is at least arguable that by sidestepping the issue, the court has ac-
cepted ab silencio Judge Furgeson's interpretation of Williams. As it re-
lates to the fact that the substance found in the suitcase was not the one
the canine was trained to detect, the court of appeals simply reasoned
that because the canine had been shown to satisfy border patrol stan-
dards, the alert satisfied a finding of probable cause to search it. By do-
ing so, the panel is assuming that the canine truly alerted to the residual
116. Id. The court also mentions "[h]indsight may be twenty-twenty, but whether
probable cause existed at the time of the search may not be determined by what the search
actually yields. It is a basic tenet of the Fourth Amendment that 'a search is not to be
made legal by what it turns up."' Id. at 815 (citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,
595 (1948)). While true, this concept is based on the premise that sufficient probable cause
exists to perform a search in the first place, something the author does not believe was
established by the government in Outlaw. The court then mentions "[likewise, a search is
not made illegal by what it fails to turn up." Id. (citing Di Re, 332 U.S. at 595); see also
United States v. Johnstone, 574 F.2d 1269, 1273 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding that "unconstitu-
tional search based on unfounded suspicion was not made constitutional merely because
the search revealed contraband items"). As it turns out, the author believes, because the
government failed to validate the alert that led to the discovery of drugs that the canine
was not trained to detect, the discovery of the unexpected contraband had the effect of
turning a bad search into a good one.
117. Outlaw, 184 F. Supp. 2d, at 816.
118. United States v. Outlaw, 319 F.3d 701, 704-05 n.2 (5th Cir. 2003).
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odor of a drug that it is trained to detect. It is troublesome enough that
the court accepted that the canine's training under border patrol stan-
dards satisfies the accepted standards for the field, without allowing the
defendant's expert the opportunity to subject them to a meaningful re-
view. More troubling is the fact that, as mentioned, the border patrol
agents in charge of the canine's training did not keep records of its per-
formance in the field. Like all other tools used in law enforcement, the
defense must be allowed the right to examine its inner workings, and then
be allowed a meaningful challenge with expert opinion of its own. At
least for the moment, the government continues to enjoy carte blanche to
continue performing searches in the border region without having to
demonstrate documentation supporting the training and reliability of its
canines, which consequently denies the defense the right to challenge
these claims.
IV. WHEN A DOG SNIFF Is A SEARCH: THE USE OF
CANINES ON PEOPLE
The practice of using dogs to perform up-close sniffs on humans re-
quires close scrutiny. Presently, canines used in this fashion are not muz-
zled, and the normal apprehension created on a person being sniffed,
raises serious concerns about the safety of the practice. An approach by
a dog could bring about a reaction in a person that itself could be per-
ceived as a threat by the animal, possibly resulting in injury. At least one
judge disapproves of the practice, observing that "[c]ertainly [United
States v.] Place does not authorize the use by law enforcement officials of
dogs to sniff persons."11 9 Further, "such use of dogs is normally inconsis-
tent with the concepts embodied in our Constitution."12
It was the Fifth Circuit that first recognized that the use of trained
canines to sniff people brings the practice within the purview of the
Fourth Amendment. In Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School Dis-
trict,12 1 the Fifth Circuit was faced with resolving a suit brought by high
school students who were subjected to a sniff by trained narcotics
canines. 22 The court declared that Fourth Amendment protection
should be strongest in situations where intentional bodily intrusions are
involved, regardless of whether the intruder is a person or a dog.' 23 The
119. United States v. Beale (Beale II), 731 F.2d 590, 596 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983) (Rein-
hardt, J., dissenting on other grounds).
120. Id.
121. 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982).
122. See Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982); see
also H. Paul Honsinger, 44 LA. L. REV. 1093, 1097-99 (1984) (noting that Horton is one of
the few cases which have addressed canine searches in the school setting).
123. See Horton, 690 F.2d 470.
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court held that the up-close sniffing of the students constituted a search
within the purview of the Fourth Amendment. 124 In addition, the court
concluded that the use of the dog on a student at school required a predi-
cate of reasonable particularized suspicion. 125 The holding in Horton was
recently adopted also in a school setting, by the Ninth Circuit in B.C. v.
Plumas Unified School District.126 However, as we will see two decades
later, the concerns expressed by the Fifth Circuit in Horton disappear
when the practice occurs in the border region.
A. As Pedestrians
In United States v. Kelly, 127 decided twenty years after Horton, the Dis-
trict Court for the Laredo Division of the Southern District of Texas de-
cided whether the up-close sniffing of persons coming from Mexico to the
United States via a pedestrian walkway at an international bridge was a
search.12 ' Kelly was entering the United States through the walkway
when a drug-sniffing dog, purposefully stationed in close proximity to the
pedestrian traffic, approached him and sniffed him by pressing its snout
124. See id. at 470. Horton recognized that an opposite view was espoused by the
Seventh Circuit in Doe v. Renfrow, where "the school, with the assistance of the police,
used dogs for general, exploratory sniffing of students." Id. at 475; see also Honsinger,
supra note 122, at 1099. There, the court held that "the sniff of a dog is not a search,
particularly in view of the diminished expectations of privacy inherent in a public school,
the school's right and duty in loco parentis to supervise students and maintain an educa-
tionally sound environment, and the minimal intrusion involved." Id. Horton mentions its
support for Jones v. Latexo Indep. Sch. Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 236 (E.D. Tex. 1980), where
the Latexo Independent School District used dogs to sniff both students and automobiles,
which explicitly rejected Doe v. Renfrow. See id. See also, e.g., Martin R. Gardner, Snif-
fing for Drugs in the Classroom-Perspectives on Fourth Amendment Scope, 74 Nw. U. L.
REV. 803 (1980); Note, The Constitutionality of Canine Searches in the Classroom, 71 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 39 (1980); Erica Tina Heifer, Comment, Search and Seizure in
Public Schools: Are Our Children's Rights Going to the Dogs?, 24 ST. Louis U. L.J. 119,
131-33 (1979).
Besides Doe v. Renfrow, one other circuit has allowed the suspicionless sniff of a per-
son's body by a canine. In Romo v. Champion, 46 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 1995), the Tenth
Circuit upheld the discovery of drugs following the canine sniff of a vehicle and its passen-
gers, by contact, at a roadblock leading to a prison parking lot, which resulted in the dis-
covery of marijuana. The court stated that there was little doubt that the search was
"executed pursuant to special needs independent of traditional criminal law enforce-
ment... [t]he government's interest in the operation of a prison presents 'special needs'
beyond law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-
cause requirements." Romo, 46 F.3d at 1017 (citing Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188 at 1194
(10th Cir.1989)). The "special needs" category of searches is discussed further below.
125. Horton, 690 F.2d at 481.
126. 192 F.3d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1999).
127. 128 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
128. See United States v. Kelly, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1021 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
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on his groin. After what the dog's trainer described as an alert, Kelly was
taken to a room and eventually ordered to remove his pants, revealing a
bundle hidden in his groin containing Valium and Rohyphnol pills.
1. The Mechanics of a Search
Following Horton, Judge Keith P. Ellison held that "the up-close snif-
fing of people by trained canines 'offends reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy,' and determined that the sniff on Kelly's body was a search under
the Fourth Amendment."2 9 He then discussed border-search precedent
to determine the reasonableness of the search. He noted that "[wihen [a]
search occurs at the border, the balance is 'struck much more favorably to
the Government' because of its strong interest in protecting its bor-
ders."' 3 ° He further added that certain "routine border searches" are
reasonable simply because they occur at the border.131 These searches
include "non-intrusive pat-downs, the removal of a suspect's outer cloth-
ing, and inspection of the contents of pockets, purses, and wallets."' 32 A
more intrusive border search requires a showing of reasonable
suspicion.133
129. Id. at 1023.
130. Id. at 1025 (citations omitted). In light of the tragic events of September 11th
2001, additional discussion of this language is warranted. In United States v. Skipwith, the
Fifth Circuit, faced with the heightened problem of air piracy in the early 1970s, com-
mented that "[b]itter experience has taught us that the physical dangers of mass kidnap-
ping and extortion posed by air piracy are even greater than the dangers against which the
usual border search is directed." United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1973).
The court then elaborated as follows:
Determination of what is reasonable requires a weighing of the harm against the need.
When the object of the search is simply the detection of past crime, probable cause to
arrest is generally the appropriate test. When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of
human lives and millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up
of a large airplane, the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness, so long as the
search is conducted in good faith for the purpose of preventing hijacking or like dam-
age and with reasonable scope and the passenger has been given advance notice of his
liability to such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air.
Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1276 (citing United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 1972) (J.
Friendly, concurring)).
In spite of our country's growing concern over terrorism, the courts must not lose sight
of the need, as best put into words by Judge Friendly, to distinguish between the use of a
canine at an airport for the purpose of detecting narcotics and to detect explosives. While
the use of canines trained to detect explosives and other detectable tools of the terrorist
trade may allow for the suspicionless, albeit safe sniffing of a person's body, the courts
must ensure that the canine used is trained only for that purpose.
131. Kelly, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 1023.
132. Id. (citing United States v. Sandier, 644 F.2d 1163, 1167 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc)).
133. Kelly, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 1023.
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In determining the intrusiveness of a canine sniff at the border, the
court simply relied on Horton's comment that a dog's sniff of a person,
particularly where the dog actually touches the person, may be analogous
to a Terry stop. 134 Therefore, "the up-close sniffing by trained canines is,
likewise, reasonably conducted at the border without any individualized
suspicion."1 35
Judge Ellison's reliance on the analogy language in Horton to deter-
mine the intrusiveness of the sniff on Kelly is misplaced. Horton's com-
ment was merely an introduction to a more complex analysis. In
discussing the level of suspicion necessary to justify each practice, Horton
analogized the dog sniff of a person by contact with a Terry frisk in the
context of Terry's balancing test whereby the intrusiveness of a search is
measured against society's interest in the information.13 6 Horton clearly
points out that its evaluation of the intrusiveness of the dog's sniff at the
school vis-d-vis society's need for information is a study separate from
other types of searches:
Because the sniffing in this case occurred in a school environment,
we need not address the question whether the sniffing of a person in
a non-school setting is sufficiently intrusive to require the full pano-
ply of fourth amendment protections-probable cause and a war-
rant-or whether such sniffing is less intrusive, requiring only
reasonable suspicion. We leave that question for another day.
137
Horton adds that the general requirements of the Fourth Amendment
are usually modified to deal with special situations. 3 ' The Horton court
further elaborated, that because reasonableness is dependant on circum-
stances, the public school system demands specific accommodations
under the Fourth Amendment, 139 society must assume the duty to pro-
vide an environment conducive to education and to protect minors from
134. See id. (citing Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 479 (5th
Cir. 1982); see also Honsinger, supra note 122, at 1105-06. Horton did not cite authority for
this proposition. It is possible that the panel may have adopted this language from Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion in Place, in which he wrote that "a dog sniff may be a search,
but a minimally intrusive one that could be justified in this situation under Terry upon
mere reasonable suspicion." United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 762 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). However, as discussed, Place involved a canine sniff of luggage, not of peo-
ple, and thus if considered, it may have been misinterpreted by the court in Horton.
135. United States v. Kelly, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1025 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
136. See Horton, 690 F.2d at 480.
137. See id. at 479.
138. See id.; see also Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 529 (1967); United
States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973); Henderson v. United States, 390
F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967).
139. See Horton, 690 F.2d at 480-81.
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the dangers of illegal substances and other anti-social activities because
they are too young to be considered capable of restraint.14 Therefore,
school administrators and teachers merit broad discretion concerning dis-
ciplinary and supervisory powers.' 41 Even so, students need their Fourth
Amendment rights to be protected.' 42 Young students today are the citi-
zens of the future; therefore, their constitutional freedoms need protec-
tion so they do not become complacent with government principals.'
4 3
Horton therefore establishes that given society's special need for informa-
tion in a school setting, a simple showing of reasonable suspicion is
sufficient.
In a similar fashion, given our country's need to protect its borders,
border search precedent has developed its own special standard. As dis-
cussed, when a non-intrusive pat-down is the search in question, there is
no requirement for a certain level of suspicion before conducting the pat-
down.' 4 4 Reasonable suspicion, however, is required to conduct pat-
downs and other more intrusive searches. 145 Judge Ellison's conclusion
that a canine sniff of a person is no worse than a non-intrusive pat-down
is difficult to accept for several reasons. While both methods involve
touching, there are major differences. A customs official performing a
pat-down is constrained by his or her official duties.' 46 More impor-
tantly, an officer has the ability to use guided discretion and to exercise it
in a responsible manner, while a dog has the potential to react forcefully
and without thought.' 47 A human's discretion ensures not only that the
contact will not exceed the necessary limits of decency, but that it will not
result in injury. From the perspective of the person being searched, these
constraints eliminate the natural and justified apprehension of exposure
to an unfamiliar, unmuzzled, and unpredictable animal.
Accordingly, two very important factors in Kelly merited special con-
sideration by the court but were ignored. First, the contact by the dog
was unexpected and only heightened the degree of apprehension exper-
ienced by Kelly, which no doubt added to his appearing more suspi-
cious.' 4 8 Second, the canine sniff involved contact with Kelly's groin,
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See United States v. Kelly, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1025 (S.D. Tex 2001) (excusing
the lack of suspicion before searching an individual).
145. See id.
146. United States Customs, Personal Search-What to Expect, at http://www.customs.
ustreas.gov/travel/personal.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2002).
147. See Pollack, supra note 7, at 805.
148. Noting that dogs often "engender irrational fear," the court in B.C. v. Plumas
Unified Sch. Dist. observed that the fact that the search on high school students was "sud-
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which increased its offensiveness. The court in Kelly recognized that the
canine's contact with the defendant's groin added to the intrusiveness of
the preliminary sniff. 14 9 However, it still did not believe that the event
was such that the reasonable suspicion requirement should be applied.15 °
The manner in which Kelly was searched by the canine, however, clearly
represented a "non-routine and offensive" touching, and thus required at
least a predicate finding of reasonable suspicion.15'
On appeal, Kelly again presented his concerns about the non-routine,
and highly intrusive nature of the canine sniff of his groin. 52 However,
in its opinion, the court did not mention anything regarding these con-
cerns.1 53 While it adopted Horton in accepting the trial court's finding
that a sniff of a canine by contact is a search, it then evaluated its intru-
siveness by comparing to a non-intrusive pat-down, which under Sandler,
den and unannounced add[ed] to its potentially distressing, and thus invasive, character."
B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1267 (9th Cir. 1999).
149. See Kelly, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 1026.
150. See id.
151. See United States v. Sandier, 644 F.2d 1163, 1167 (5th Cir. 1981). Even Judge
Ellison concedes that the up-close sniffing of people by trained canines "offends reasona-
ble expectations of privacy" and is therefore, a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Kelly, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 1023. If a pat-down of defendant's groin area was conducted, it
may have been sufficiently intrusive such that it would itself constitute a search requiring
reasonable suspicion to support it. Id. at 1023 n.3. Without question, the discovery of the
pills occurred after Kelly was ordered to drop his pants, which itself clearly constitutes a
search meriting reasonable suspicion at the border. Therefore, whether an offensive pat-
down occurred sometime between the alleged alert and the order to undress is of no signif-
icance since both required reasonable suspicion. Ultimately, the existence of reasonable
suspicion depends on whether the canine actually alerted. Assuming the suspicionless dog
sniff of Kelly passed muster, a valid alert would constitute reasonable suspicion to either
order the offensive pat-down and/or order one to undress.
152. United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 123 S. Ct. 707
(Dec. 16, 2002). In his brief, Kelly added that "large dogs such as the Labrador breed in
the instant case" are "use[d]... to maintain an image of strength and ferocity." Horton v.
Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 482 (5th Cir. 1982). While the dog in this case
apparently did not have a history of ferocious behavior, this fact does not diminish the
"often.. irrational fear" engendered by large dogs. Id. at 483. Indeed, a dog is not always
a man's best friend. See, e.g., Douglas U. Rosenthal, When K-9's Cause Chaos - An Exam-
ination of Police Dog Policies and Their Liabilities, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 279
(1994). "[S]peaking from a trainer's point of view, '[w]e use police dogs for their sense of
smell -to find people and things. The reason the dog is trying to find something is because
he wants to bite it."' Id. at 291. Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment As A Device
For Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1246-47 (1983). "Additionally, the
very act of being subjected to a body sniff by a German Shepard may be offensive at best
or harrowing at worst to the innocent snifee." Id.
153. See generally Kelly, 302 F.3d 291. In fact, during oral argument, appellate coun-
sel for Kelly began her argument by expounding concerns about safety only to be cut off by
one of the justices who inquired that if she lost on that argument, was there anything else
that they should consider.
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clearly does not necessitate any predicate of suspicion. However, in con-
structing its analogy, the appellate court erroneously relied on the
mechanics of a Terry search. A Terry pat-down has been described as:
"[T]he officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the pris-
oner's body. A thorough search must be made of the prisoner's arms and
armpits, waistline, and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and
entire surface of the legs down to the feet., 154
This is not what Sandler envisioned as an ordinary pat-down in a bor-
der scenario. In fact, Sandler hypothesized that a more intrusive pat-
down may require reasonable suspicion. 155 It is difficult to envision a
more intrusive pat-down than one involving the "thorough search" of the
groin and testicles. After Sandier, the panel in Kelly was required to
abide by the language in Sandier, unless of course, the issue was consid-
ered en banc. In a clear disregard of the dictates of an en banc opinion,
the panel in Kelly reasoned that a canine sniff of the groin was the
equivalent of an ordinary Terry-type pat down, and therefore, does not
require reasonable suspicion. As it will be discussed below, this flawed
construct has now migrated into another recent Fifth Circuit opinion in-
volving a canine sniff of a person.
B. In Vehicles
It is well settled law that a canine alert on a vehicle constitutes proba-
ble cause to search the vehicle.156 However, is that probable cause finite?
Does the probable cause extend to the occupants of the vehicle, allowing
a search of their body?
The use of dogs at a pedestrian walkway on an international bridge is
not the only indiscriminate means used to search for illegal drugs. Re-
cently, a border patrol canine handler admitted to routinely boarding oc-
cupied commercial buses at immigration checkpoints with his canine.157
In United States v. Garcia-Garcia,158 the defendant was a passenger on a
Greyhound bus that made a stop for a routine immigration check at the
IH-35 border patrol checkpoint north of Laredo, Texas. 159 While sniffing
the interior of the luggage compartment located in the lower half of the
bus, a canine reportedly alerted to the presence of drugs in the bathroom
154. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17, n.13 (1968) (citations omitted).
155. See Sandier, 644 F.2d, at 1167, n.5.
156. See United States v. Williams , 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1995).
157. See United States v. Garcia-Garcia, Memorandum and Order, No. L-01-727 (S.D.
Tex.-Laredo Div. Oct. 17, 2001) (on file with author).
158. Memorandum and Order, No. L-01-727 (S.D. Tex.-Laredo Div. Oct. 17, 2001)
(on file with author).
159. Id. at 1.
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area, located at the rear of the bus.160 While the bus was still occupied by
passengers, the handler walked his dog onto the bus.1 61 As it was pulling
ahead of him, making its way through the middle aisle in the direction of
the bathroom, the dog entered the defendant's seating area, and sniffed
at his lower leg, making contact in the process. 62 The dog alerted to the
presence of drugs on the defendant's body, resulting in the discovery of
marijuana. 163
1. Scope of the Search
Armed with probable cause as a result of the canine's alert on the bot-
tom half of the bus, Garcia-Garcia conceded that the agent was entitled
to search it. Garcia-Garcia then argued that by allowing the dog to walk
through the middle walkway on its way to the bathroom, the handler also
subjected the passengers of the bus to being sniffed by the canine, result-
ing in a search separate from the one justified by the initial alert. In or-
der to limit the search of the bus to the bathroom area without violating
the passengers' right to privacy, Garcia-Garcia argued that the agent
should have allowed them to exit the bus prior to the handler's insertion
of the canine.164
In the trial court's opinion, Chief Judge George P. Kazen observed that
it is reasonable to assume that a commercial bus traveling on an interstate
highway and arriving at a permanent border checkpoint will stop, and the
passengers will be subjected to an immigration inspection.165 Judge
Kazen concluded that because the canine alerted to the interior of the
bus, the agents had sufficient probable cause to search inside. 166 This
alert he added, provided sufficient probable cause "to believe that some
person or persons on the bus were in possession of illegal narcotics., 167
Therefore, it was not unreasonable to lead the canine inside the bus in an
attempt to discover the location of the narcotics.1 6 Judge Kazen con-
cluded that leading the canine towards the bathroom was "as reasonable,
if not more so," than Garcia-Garcia's request to evacuate all persons on
the bus.169
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 3.
165. Id. at 4.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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The Supreme Court first addressed this issue in United States v. Di
Re.170 In Di Re, the government asked the court to extend the right to
search a vehicle to include a person in instances where the contraband
sought is a small article easily concealable on the person.17' The court
responded that there was reasonable cause to search the car, but asked
whether that conferred an incidental right to search Di Re.' 72 The Su-
preme Court resolved the issue by stating that it was not convinced that a
person's mere presence in a vehicle suspected of containing contraband,
loses his or her immunities from a search to which everyone is entitled. 73
Years later in Ybarra v Illinois,74 the court again revisited the issue,
holding that probable cause to search a bar for narcotics did not translate
into probable cause to search the patrons inside.1 75
It is important to note that when evaluating whether the valid search of
a vehicle extends to its passengers, the court in Di Re gave little impor-
tance to the possibility that a passenger in the vehicle could well be in-
volved in the illegal activity in question. 176 Thus, the opinion clearly
rejects the notion that an alert to the interior of the bus necessarily means
that agents have probable cause to believe that a person or persons inside
the bus were in possession of illegal narcotics. The soundness of this posi-
tion is further compromised when, as in Garcia-Garcia, the vehicle is a
commercial passenger bus that transports many more people who ordina-
rily have minimal, if any, association with each other.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit rejected the trial court's reasoning, finding
that "[wihile the sniff alert to the undercarriage of the bus provided prob-
able cause to search the vehicle, it did not automatically also provide
probable cause to search the individuals in the vehicle. 1 7 Quoting from
Ybarra, the court stated:
[W]here the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a per-
son must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect
to that person. This requirement cannot be undercut or avoided by
simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists probable
cause to search or seize another or to search the premises where the
person may happen to be. The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
170. 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
171. See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 586 (1948).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 87.
174. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
175. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).
176. See Di Re, 332 U.S. at 586-87.
177. United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 319 F.3d 726, 730 (5th Cir. 2003).
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protect the 'legitimate expectations of privacy of persons, not
places.' 178
2. Insertion of the Canine in the Bus
Unlike the trial court in Kelly, which relied directly on Horton to find
that the canine sniff of a person at the border is a search, Chief Judge
Kazen limited Horton to its own facts and ignored the court's finding in
Kelly.179 Besides Kelly and Horton, other decisions support Garcia-Gar-
cia's conclusion that the dog's entrance into the passenger compartment
of the bus and its subsequent alert on his leg was a search. These opin-
ions actually focus on the propriety of the practice of using canines on
people.
While canine sniffs have been upheld in areas such as a train's sleeper
compartment aisle1 80 and a hotel corridor, 8' these holdings are distin-
guishable because they involved canine alerts on things rather than per-
sons. More importantly, United States v. Colyer182 considers it significant
that in Place, the luggage searched was completely removed from the sus-
pect's presence. 83 Colyer also notes that a similar concern was addressed
by United States v. Beale (Beale III),184 where the Ninth Circuit deemed it
important that in both United States v. Jacobsen'85 and United States v.
Place,186 the Supreme Court approved investigative techniques that did
not require contact with the owner of the items being searched.' 87 The
Colyer court elaborated and determined that the fact that the items in
Jacobsen and Place were completely removed from their owners' posses-
178. Id. at 730 (quoting Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979)); see United States v.
Munoz, 957 F.2d 171, 173 (5th Cir. 1992). "Officers executing a search warrant of a partic-
ular premises may not search a person found on the premises absent individualized proba-
ble cause." Id.
179. Compare Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982),
with United States v. Garcia-Garcia, Memorandum and Order, No. L-01-727, at 3-4 (S.D.
Tex. Oct. 17, 2001) (on file with author).
180. See United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
181. See United States v. Roby, 122 F.3d 1120, 1124-25 (8th Cir. 1997).
182. 878 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
183. See Colyer, 878 F.2d at 476; see also LAFAVE, supra note 55, at 373 (noting Place
addresses only the situation of exposure of luggage to the dog in the suspect's absence).
184. 736 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
185. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
186. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
187. See United States v. Beale (Beale III), 736 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc);
see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 121-22 (1984); United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 707 (1983). For a complete examination of Beale, see Williams F. Timmons, Re-
examining the Use of Drug-Detecting Dogs Without Probable Cause, 71 GEO. L.J. 1233
(1983).
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sion is subsumed by compelling concerns regarding overbearing and
harassing investigative procedures. 188 The court refrained from con-
fronting the scenario set forth in Justice Brennan's dissent in Jacobsen
wherein officers allowed a trained dog to randomly roam the streets and
alert them to people carrying drugs. 189 The Colyer court declined to ad-
dress whether in-person confrontations by a canine would constitute a
search and seizure, and likewise reserved a determination of whether
other problems inherent in such a practice exist for "another day."' 9°
Unlike the scenarios in Colyer and Roby, where each court found no
risk that the dog would come in contact with people, the canine's mere
presence on the bus walkway, given its design (similar to the pedestrian
walkway in Kelly), was itself overbearing, annoying, harassing, and dan-
gerous. Moreover, allowing the canine to roam between aisles of occu-
pied seats gave it the discretion to stick its nose on whomever and in
whatever manner it pleased, which it promptly did.' 9 ' The "another day"
contemplated in Colyer is now upon us.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit made no comment whatsoever regarding
the border patrol agent's practice of allowing his canine to roam the inte-
rior of the occupied bus. It assumed that the unmuuzzled canine could be
allowed to lead its handler down the walkway of the interior of an occu-
pied bus. The panel was content to note that "Garcia admits that the dog
did not hurt him in anyway, either by scratching him, knocking him over,
or biting him."' 92 Beginning with Kelly, the Fifth Circuit is currently as-
suming a wait and see approach, where it will allow law enforcement full
authority to employ canines on people, and perhaps will evaluate the in-
trusiveness of a canine sniff only when a person-of any age-is
scratched, knocked over or bitten in the process. This is far from the
cautionary tone expressed in Horton.193 As the protector of the people's
right not to be subjected to warrantless and unreasonable searches, the
court has demonstrated a reckless disregard for the safety of large num-
bers of pedestrians who enter our borders, and an equally large number
of people who travel in the border region.
188. See United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
189. See id.; see also Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 138.
190. Colyer, 878 F.2d at 476 n.6.
191. See id. at 476 (implying that it is the degree of proximity to, and not the actual
contact with a person, that determines whether the dog's conduct constitutes a search)
(citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
192. United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 319 F.3d 726, 728 (5th Cir. 2003).
193. See Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 479-80 (5th Cir. 1982)
(describing the high degree of intrusiveness and subsequent fear inherent in a canine sniff
upon a person and concluding that the sniff was a search under the Fourth Amendment).
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3. Was Garcia-Garcia Searched?
But even assuming that law enforcement agencies could eventually de-
vise a safe and unintimidating manner for sniffing people with canines,194
what degree of suspicion must be demonstrated by law enforcement au-
thorities to support its use at a checkpoint?
Relying on Kelly and Horton, the appellate panel assumed, "'without
deciding,' that a dog sniff of an individual is a search when the dog also
makes contact with the individual's body," and therefore, "such a search
is analogous to a frisk or pat-down of the type envisioned by the Supreme
Court in Terry v. Ohio."1 95 In evaluating the reasonableness of the
search of Garcia-Garcia's body, the court stated "[w]hile the dog's initial
alert in the luggage bin did not provide individualized reasonable suspi-
cion to search Garcia, the dog's subsequent alert in the aisle of the bus
did provide reasonable suspicion that Garcia possessed the drugs that the
dog sensed." '196 The court added:
[w]hen the dog then indicated to Garcia by crawling under his seat,
sniffing him more closely and touching its nose to Garcia's shoes and
lower leg, that sniff-and-contact search was reasonable given that, as
we stated in Horton and reiterated in Kelly, the sniff-and-contact is
the fundamental equivalent of a Terry stop. 1 97
So while the court found that the canine's actions in this case consti-
tuted a search, with one wipe, it also reduced the government's burden in
performing the search of a person at a checkpoint' from probable
cause, to reasonable suspicion. For the reasons given in this portion of
this article dealing with Kelly, the author believes that a canine sniff of a
person, especially by contact, is more intrusive than a Terry search-
more commonly known as a Terry pat-down search. While it is one thing
to analogize the level of intrusiveness of a full Terry search with the sniff-
and-contact search of a person, it is quite another to employ this similar-
ity as a justification for requiring the same reasonable suspicion predicate
for each.
The court's reliancc on Horton to reach its conclusion is erroneous. As
previously discussed, while Horton required only a showing of particular-
194. In Garcia-Garcia, the canine handler acknowledged that he does not allow his
canine to come too close to people because of concerns about "liability." United States v.
Garcia-Garcia, Memorandum and Order, No. L-01-727 (S.D. Tex.-Laredo Div. Oct. 17,
2001) (on file with author).
195. Garcia-Garcia, 319 F.3d at 730 (citations omitted).
196. Id. at 731.
197. Id.
198. See United States v. Portillo-Aguirre, 311 F.3d 647, 652 (5th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558, 567 (1976).
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ized suspicion to justify the up-close search of students, the court did so
only after it determined that they were confronted with a special need to
protect children from a drug environment. Recently, the Supreme Court
in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond'9 9 provided a list of those circum-
stances that require less than probable cause to allow a search.200 Those
involve certain regimes that demand suspicionless searches to meet spe-
cial needs, which reach "beyond the normal need for law enforce-
ment."'20 1 Our case involved a search for the purpose of uncovering
general crime at an immigration checkpoint. In Garcia-Garcia, the Fifth
Circuit fails to acknowledge that probable cause is presumed to be re-
quired before Garcia was searched by the canine. The court's reliance on
Kelly is also mistaken. Unlike the case at an immigration checkpoint, bor-
der-search precedent recognizes the concept of a pat-down search for the
purpose of finding all types of contraband.
The court's simplistic approach also ignores the fact that a Terry pat-
down search is unique in the world of the Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence. In creating the Terry search, the Supreme Court focused on the
officer's objectively reasonable fear for his or her safety, not the officer's
simple desire to discover contraband, such as drugs (or even weapons),
which was the sole purpose of the search of Garcia-Garcia's body. 0 2 In
fact, the Supreme Court has refused to accept anything less than probable
cause when evaluating the "touch and feel" search of a person's cloth-
ing.213 And most recently, in a case arising out of the Fifth Circuit, the
199. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
200. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); see also, e.g., Vernonia
School Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (allowing for random drug testing of student-
athletes); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (mandating drug tests for
United States Customs Service employees seeking transfer or promotion to certain posi-
tions); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (providing for
drug and alcohol tests for railway employees involved in train accidents or found to be in
violation of particular safety regulations).
201. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37.
202. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). The Supreme Court also distinguished
between the two principal government interests behind the Terry stop. The Court noted
that the governmental interest in crime prevention alone was not enough to justify the
Terry stop. Instead, it relied on the "more immediate interest of the police officer in taking
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him." Id. at 23.
203. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 379 (1993) (invalidating a Terry search
based on the fact that the illegal character of the object was not readily identifiable based
on the Terry pat-down alone and because the officer lacked probable cause to conduct a
further search). In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia wrote: "I am unaware, however, of
any precedent for a physical search of a person thus temporarily detained for questioning.
... As a policy matter, it may be desirable to permit 'frisks' for weapons, but not to en-
courage 'frisks' for drugs by admitting evidence other than weapons." Id. at 381-82 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
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"touch and squeeze" of a person's luggage, coincidentally, also took place
inside a commercial bus at an immigration checkpoint.20 4 Despite the
holdings in Dickerson and Bond, both of which involved searches of a
clearly less-intrusive nature, the Fifth Circuit continues to look the other
way. Failing to pay heed to the concerns of other circuits and judges who
question whether canines should even be allowed into the close proximity
of humans, the Fifth Circuit has opted to allow sniff-and-contact searches
of people for the purpose of detecting general crime with only a simple
finding of reasonable suspicion.
In sum, while the panel recognized the Supreme Court's holding in
Ybarra, and held that probable cause to search a vehicle does not trans-
late into probable cause to search its passengers, its later reasoning ren-
dered the acknowledgment meaningless. After Garcia-Garcia, there is
nothing to stop law enforcement authorities from introducing canines to
sniff the interior of an occupied vehicle, which will at the very least result
in highly intrusive contact with its passengers. As it did in Outlaw and
Kelly, the Fifth Circuit in Garcia-Garcia has again taken the easy road by
failing to address the complexities of these issues of first impression.
V. CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that a properly trained canine is highly reliable as a
detection tool for law enforcement. However, in order for the practice to
pass Fourth Amendment muster, it is necessary for the courts to require
that the government demonstrate accountability by producing proper
documentation. This documentation should demonstrate that a canine is
properly trained to detect the substance the handler claims the canine
alerted to. Further, the documentation should also demonstrate the relia-
bility of the canine. For this to occur, the Fifth Circuit must overrule
Williams in favor of the training-reliability majority view. Only then will
the respective law enforcement agencies begin to require the creation and
maintenance of this documentation.
Despite a disappointing end to a promising start in Outlaw, Judge
Furgeson has again exposed Williams' deficiencies as the Fifth Circuit's
controlling precedent on whether a canine's reliability will be subjected
to meaningful testing. In the meantime, via discovery and suppression
hearings, lawyers must continue to inquire whether the canine in question
is trained and re-certified by accepted standards other than the untested,
and largely unknown methods presently claimed to be in use by law en-
forcement agencies. Lawyers must also continue to inquire whether the
canine meets the minimum standards of reliability.
204. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000).
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With Kelly and Garcia-Garcia, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit has left many questions unanswered about the search
standards used to govern canine sniffs. Hopefully, with the help of a
more active defense bar, these issues will soon be resolved in a proper
and workable manner.
